When, if At All, Should the State be Prepared to Talk to Terrorists?

There is not a more appropriate time to consider talking to terrorists. In 2020 alone, 13 826 deaths occurred because of terrorism. So, what do states do about terrorism? In the words of President Obama’s National Security Advisor Susan Rice, “we don’t negotiate with terrorists, that’s the policy of the United States”. Almost all states concur, taking the public position that they will never negotiate with terrorists. However, as history shows, states do talk to terrorists. The French government negotiated the Evian Accords with the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria and the British government held secret talks with the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which eventually led to the Good Friday Agreement. Talking to terrorists encompasses a range of covert and formal, public activities. On the one hand, it refers to communications such as unofficial backchannel conversations, particularly with low-level members of terrorist organisations. In the absence of formal diplomacy, the state will use their intelligence community for these talks where deniable communications between adversaries may be helpful. Talking can also be a public activity, such as public meetings and formal negotiations, although this is often practically difficult for democratic leaders because talking to terrorist groups that are targeting their constituents could undermine their own reputation. This is in part due to the fact the term “terrorist” lacks a universally accepted definition and is a political and pejorative term that is used by policymakers to delegitimise individuals and groups, allowing them to both legally and morally justify hard security measures. For the purposes of this paper, I will use the term ‘terrorist’ to refer to any non-state armed group that enjoys political support and uses ‘terrorist tactics’-that is, the use of violence against civilians for political purposes.

This paper will argue that states should always be prepared to talk to terrorists. Particularly at the covert level, talking allows the state to gain intelligence on a terrorist groups grievances and overall objectives which provides the necessary foundations for future, formal negotiations. This is crucial because even if the state is militarily successful against a terrorist group, negotiations will ensure long-term stability. The popular objections to talking to terrorists that are often cited by policymakers will be addressed. After debunking these objections, I will then draw on scholarly analysis to provide a set of preferable conditions that make formal negotiations more likely to succeed. In the absence of these conditions, states should not embark on formal negotiations, but should continue to talk to terrorist groups at the covert level. The last part of this paper is concerned with how states should go about talking to radical Islamic organisations which is of relevance in the contemporary world, using a case study of the Islamic State (ISIS) to argue that states can and should talk to ISIS, although the conditions for successful negotiations are at present, absent.

Objections to Talking to Terrorists: ‘Old’ vs ‘New’

The objections to talking to terrorists are grounded in a school of thought that distinguishes between ‘old’ and ‘new’ terrorism based on their goals, methods, and organisation. Proponents of this model argue ‘old’ terrorist groups, operating prior to 1990, had rational, limited goals linked to territory, decolonisation and national identity. This includes ethnic-separatist terrorist groups who used terrorism to achieve autonomy or independence from a state or military force such as the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), the Jewish Irgun in Palestine and the Irish Republican Army (IRA). It also includes groups such as the Red Army Faction and the Italian Red Brigades who, inspired by socialist ideologies aimed at destroying the monarchy and/or the state. The goals of ‘new’ terrorists are derived from religious doctrines that emphasize apocalyptic beliefs, particularly radical Islamists such as Al Qaeda, Jemaah al-Islamiya and Islamic State. The argument is that states could prepare to talk to ‘old’ terrorist groups because they had political and therefore rational goals. States cannot negotiate with ‘new’ terrorist groups because they have irrational, maximalist goals derived from religious doctrine and their methods are more indiscriminately violent than their predecessors. In the political domain, this has led to the popular view that they are too irrational – psychopathic even - for the state to consider negotiations, particularly given the context of a ‘global jihad’ against the West.

There is little evidence supporting the assertion that terrorist behaviour is a result of psychopathy or other mental disorder. The argument that ‘new’ terrorist groups are more indiscriminate in their acts of violence is based on the idea that, dependent on popular support, ‘old’ terrorist groups were more restrained as excessive brutality would have lost them popular support and the opportunity to negotiate with the state. However, ‘old’ terrorists also used excessive brutality at times. For example, the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) indiscriminately targeted civilians using bombings, torture and executing thousands of its own fighters and supporters to control the populace during the Algerian war of independence. Finally, while it may not be a rationality that policymakers can comprehend, ‘new’ terrorist groups, are pursuing rational objectives, albeit contained in violent and religious rhetoric. Former leader of Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, often discussed the political grievances motivating Al-Qaeda’s violence against the West, such as the American invasion of Lebanon in 1982. To an extent, Al-Qaeda sees its violence as a rational way of ending what they consider a foreign occupation by the West, much like the ‘old’ terrorist groups.

Scholars have also objected to talking to terrorists on the grounds that it is a betrayal of democratic values because talking to groups who pursue violence legitimises their goals and violent means. Countering this view, in research conducted in 2008, Jones and Libicki found the most common way terrorist groups ended between 1968 and 2006 was the transition to the political process. Terrorists generally turn to violence because they believe there is no non-violent means of redressing their grievances. In Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams stated he “defended the right of the IRA to engage in armed struggle. I did this because there was no alternative”. By opening secret channels of communication in 1974, trust was gradually built between leaders of the IRA and the British government, political engagement intensified, and violence was reduced.

The case for negotiating with terrorists

Military success is not enough to end armed conflicts. In the words retired U.S. Navy admiral James G. Stavridis: “you can't kill your way to success in a counterinsurgency effort”. Terrorist groups have support - whether it be minority or majority - within their communities, so it is difficult for states to completely end armed conflicts solely through military means because it cannot address the underlying grievances. If states use military tactics that are especially brutal, it can damage a governments legitimacy. For instance, during the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) the French used brutal military tactics such as torture to defeat the FLN. Militarily, France was successful, but the brutality of their methods undermined their political integrity and eventually, French President Charles De Gaulle had to initiate talks with leaders of the FLN culminating in the Evian Accords of 1962.

Talking to a terrorist group can also provide intelligence on its hierarchy, organisation and motivations. A state can then use this information to splinter the group, making it easier for the state to defeat the terrorist group using military means. For example, in the mid-1990s, the Sri Lankan government brought the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to the negotiating table. In 2004, Colonel Karuna of the LTTE defected to the Sri Lankan government. This created a strategic opportunity to eliminate the LTTE altogether. Despite the alleged military defeat of the LTTE, there is some concern amongst governments of an LTTE resurgence and resumption of violence.

Conditions for negotiation

Although states should always be prepared to talk to terrorists, either through backchannels or secret talks, it is not always the right time to prepare to negotiate with terrorists. Several scholars have posited preferable conditions for negotiation. This paper will focus on two: the concept of a mutually hurting stalemate and mutually strong leadership. The narrow focus is a result of research conducted by Jonathan Powell, in which he found these two conditions to be present in nearly all cases of successful negotiations with terrorist groups. A mutually hurting stalemate, is defined as a circumstance where all sides of a conflict perceive further violence as counterproductive. Terrorist groups will be motivated to come to the negotiating table if they believe it will result in an outcome more favourable than the outcome achieved through violence.

Secondly, in the absence of strong, political leadership on both sides that are committed to reaching an agreement, negotiations will likely fail. Talks could damage the political reputation of policymakers, and similarly leaders of terrorist groups who engage in talks risk being perceived as traitors by their own constituencies, which risks creating splinter groups that are potentially more violent, such as the Real IRA. Strong leaders, willing to make compromises and take political and personal risk, are vital for successful negotiations. For example, at great political risk, former State President F.W. de Klerk, realising apartheid could not continue, held a referendum amongst the white population to see if he had majority support for his proposed reforms, which went against the legacy of apartheid. Ultimately, he won the majority, and Mandela also made concessions, such as protecting white minority seats in the new national assembly.

Should the state be prepared to negotiate with ISIS?

Arguably, the most prevalent threat states face from terrorism is from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). When confronted with the notion of talking to them, it is ‘deemed beyond the pale’. As Dharmasingham argues, unlike the IRA, ISIS is an organisation that is transforming its views towards violence, which raises questions as to how the state can negotiate with a group that rejects democracy, and lacks negotiable goals because of its fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. Furthermore, now that the Global Coalition Force has seized ISIS’s last stronghold, there is simply no strategic reason to engage them in talks.

The argument that ISIS are fundamentally different from any other terrorist group has been “said that about each new armed group since the rise of the IRA in 1919”. States have successfully negotiated with Islamic terrorist groups in the past, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines. The MILF sought an autonomous region for Muslims separate from the central government. In 2014, the Philippine government signed a peace agreement creating the semi-independent Muslim "Bangsamoro" region which, amongst other things, accepted Sharia law for its Muslim population. In exchange, the MILF would stop violence against the national government and against civilians. One of the reasons the negotiations were successful was because the Philippine government did not classify the MILF as a ‘terrorist organization’ which allowed it to bring the MILF into the political process. Hellyer argues that the MILF, in contrast to ISIS had political goals rather than Islamic. Based on a fundamental interpretation of Islam, ISIS cannot modify its ideology. Although the transformation of a former jihadi organisation into a political party is rare, the case of the he Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), shows it is possible for an Islamic terrorist organisation to modify its ideology and join the political process. The EIJ, an Egyptian terrorist organization linked to al-Qaeda in the 1980s and 1990s that urged Muslims in the name of jihad to use violence for the purpose of creating an Islamic state-a very similar ideology as ISIS. However, in 2011, the EIJ denounced terrorism, formally joining the political process in the form of the ‘Islamic Party’ and the ‘Building and Development Party’ in Egypt. Thus, Islamic terrorist groups can modify their views once the possibility of peace talks are actualised, meaning the state recognises their aims as legitimate.

Arguably, a mutually hurting stalemate and strong leadership are at present, absent in the Middle East making negotiations with ISIS unlikely to succeed. This does not, however, mean states should not prepare to engage in talks. As stated at the start of this paper, ‘talks’ encompass several activities, including backchannel talks and secret contacts with low-level officials. This builds a foundation for a formal peace process, allowing states to gain an understanding of what the underlying grievances driving ISIS are. This would involve recognising that whilst the establishment of a Caliphate is not an acceptable demand, there are legitimate grievances that states could discuss. For example, ISIS wants to overthrow corrupt “apostate” regimes in the Middle East, particularly the Abadi regime in Iraq whom it sees as disenfranchising Sunni Muslims. In Iraq, the former Baathists are a powerful actor in the rise of ISIS providing highly effective guidance on explosives, strategy, planning and manpower. The ex-Baathists are individuals whom states could prepare to talk with, particularly given that they also share legitimate grievances with the Iraqi government. Specifically, Sunni Arabs believe their representatives are unjustly targeted through the program of de-Baathification, with its policies obstructing Sunni representation and further weakening trust in the central government. Hellyer argues that ISIS is a “radical supra-nationalist group” - not a nationalist group that wants to address Sunni grievances. But ISIS is successful largely because it has capitalised on the fear and anger of disempowered Sunnis in Iraq and Syria. Many of these individuals are moderates and are concerned with these legitimate grievances which are issues states can discuss. This will empower moderate voices, paving the way for a future peace settlement, as in the case of Gerry Adams in Northern Ireland.

Understandably, it is difficult for democratic states to justify talking to a group that continues to inflict terrorist violence on their own constituents, particularly after 9/11. It is therefore unrealistic to argue that states should negotiate with ISIS publicly. Talking to terrorists does not just involve formal negotiation; covert engagements would help states to understand the political, social and economic drivers of their violence, helping to reveal their motivations and establish a channel for future formal talks. In Northern Ireland, numerous British Prime Ministers held secret talks both directly and indirectly with the IRA for decades prior to the Good Friday Agreement. Talking to terrorists, whether it is the IRA or ISIS begins a gradual process of non-violent political contestation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, states should always be prepared to talk to terrorists, even if the right conditions for formal negotiations are absent. Even if a state is militarily successful, unless the grievances driving the organisation and that form the base of popular support are addressed, conflict resolution is unlikely. States therefore will always inevitably have to find a political solution to terrorism. A ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ creates the necessary conditions for formal negotiations and mutually strong leadership that is willing to make concessions ensures the success of the formal peace process. However, states should always maintain informal backchannels of secret talks with terrorist groups. In the case of ISIS, misguided objections have prevented any real progress in addressing the political grievances driving the organisation and recruitment to it on an unprecedented global scale. Past experiences of negotiating with terrorist groups has revealed that ISIS and other ‘new’ terrorist groups are not radically different from the ‘old’. States must move beyond the perception of ISIS as too evil and irrational to engage them in talks if long-term peace and stability is to be achieved.

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Written by: Kia Taryn Howson Written at: King’s College London Written for: Dr Eleanora Natale Date written: November 2021