Jinnah, Islam and Pakistan’s National Identity

Throughout its relatively brief history, Pakistan has faced the intense struggle of unifying a large and diverse civilian population under one central government. Considering Pakistan’s creation was under the rallying promise of a Muslim homeland, it is interesting to consider why Islam has not unified the state. The answer to this question is multifaceted - from the outset, Jinnah’s legacy left an unclear vision as to how Islam was to be implemented, sectarian divisions within Islam and the consequent politicisation and militarisation of Islam have made it a force for division, rather than a force of unity. Of course, the Pakistani Islamists would completely reject the notion that Islam is anything but a force of unity, however there is an abundance of evidence to the contrary.

Whilst Islam is recognised as the state religion, its place in Pakistan’s national identity is fraught with uncertainty. From the outset, there is a consistent theme of ambiguity especially concerning Jinnah’s intentions for Pakistan, and his vision for the role of Islam in the constitution. After the failure of the Muslim League in the 1937 Provincial Elections, Jinnah became a proponent of greater Muslim autonomy in the minority provinces, thus leading to his espousal of two-nation theory – the recognition of Muslims and Hindus as two fundamentally separate nations by religious, cultural and social differences. In 1940, Jinnah delivered a speech to the League expressing these views, allowing his two-nation theory to become the founding principle for the creation of Pakistan; his views were given legitimacy by the League’s publication of the Lahore Resolution just three days later. However, in 1947, Jinnah delivered a second speech indicating his vision for a secular Pakistan where religion remained a private affair separate from politics.

The transformation of Jinnah’s views can be attributed to the change in audience; the speech delivered to the League reflects Jinnah’s disappointment at the League’s loss in the 1937 Provincial Elections, and his call for greater Muslim autonomy from the oppression of Muslims in minority provinces. On the other hand, his speech delivered to the new Pakistani government can be interpreted as Jinnah’s attempts to organise a plural secularist state after independence. Jinnah’s early death in 1948 resulted in a legacy of uncertainty surrounding his vision for the role of Islam in the new state, especially with the emergence of revisionist historians such as Ayesha Jalal that claim Jinnah never wanted partition in the first place-his call for greater autonomy never meant mass migration.

Many of the late supporters of Pakistan were critical of the Leagues secular vision for the state and rejected the creation of Pakistan as a nationalist movement, instead envisioning Pakistan as an Islamic State where civilians were governed by Shariah Law. The secular approach to the constitution was opposed by many Deobandi ‘Ulema’, as well as Islamists such as Maududi – founder of the Islamist political party Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) that endeavoured to align the constitution with Islam. It was not until two years after independence that a formal proposal for the constitution was put forward – in 1949, the Objectives Resolution officially affirmed divine over popular sovereignty, stating that the population should live in accord with the requirements of Islam. However, the Resolution did not clarify the kind of Islam that would underpin the constitution, nor did the affirmation of divine sovereignty seem compatible with Jinnah’s vision of a secular state.

Despite the official alignment of the constitution with Islam, the Government was slow to implement the Islamic aspects of the Resolution, resulting in organised violence by the Islamists. For example, the JI organised an anti-Ahmadaya movement in 1953 where many Ahmadi Muslims were killed, and their properties burned. A legacy of Jinnah’s unclear vision for the relationship between the state and Islam has led to the start of a legacy of Islamic rhetoric that was not put into practice, which has resulted in sectarian divisions between Islamists and secularists with conflicting visions as to how Islam should fit into the constitution.

The Objectives Resolution marks the beginning of a slow process of Islamization within Pakistan, that has been a force of division rather than of unity. The compromising with the Ulema to include aspects of Islamic principles in the new constitution actively encouraged Islamist groups to politicise Islam. The problem with this is that with each new leader, a different approach to Islamization was implemented, resulting in political instability. In the Ayub era, a moderate approach to Islam was implemented which he believed reflected more closely the original vision for Pakistan. For example, Ayub implemented the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, which aimed to give greater clarity between family matters in both a legal and moral sphere. However, his administration failed to win the backing of the religious parties that wanted to define the constitution as strictly Islamic, and in 1963 they forced him to reinstate Pakistan as an Islamic Republic after protests in 1962 took place against his constitution which used the phrase ‘Republic of Pakistan’. Then in 1970, Bhutto used Islamic rhetoric to serve his campaign in the first general election, using populist phrases such “Islam, Democracy and Socialism” and “Islami Musawat” (Islamic equality) to gain popular appeal for his socialist policies. However, once in power Bhutto did not commit to developing the Islamic Ideology he had promised within the constitution and was forced out of office through a military coup headed by General Zia and the PNA movement, who opposed Bhutto and his leftist party (the PPP). What this shows is that between these two periods of rule, there is opposition to the established ruler by the religious parties, who have disapproved of the administrations where the implementation of Islam is concerned. Especially concerning Bhutto, Zia’s coup was based on the PNA’s disbelief that the PPP could have won the second general election of 1977 and took matters into their own hands by positioning a more radical Islamist leader into power.

This theme continued in General Zia’s military regime of 1977-1988, which saw a far more radical approach to Islamization; Zia took steps to implement strict Islamic law basing Pakistan’s educational and legal system on Islamic doctrine that leaned in favour of Sunni law. This led to disputes such as to how Zakat donations for the poor should be distributed. This resulted in riots in 1983 and 1984 in Karachi and Lahore. Zia’s regime turned the existing Islamic ideology implemented by Bhutto into an official policy of Islamization. Part of this policy was the use of the Islamists such as the JI to lobby against the secular politicians that opposed an Islamic regime. This is can also be seen in Musharraf’s administration (2001-2008), where the support of Islamists in return for an increase in presidential power resulted in the exile and prosecution of secularists. However, this has resulted in the Islamists gaining illegitimate positions of power within Pakistan’s government. Seeing as the Islamists have never won more than 5% of the seats in a democratically elected legislature it does not seem possible that they would have gained such positions if the state had held a legitimate election.

Clearly, the politicising of Islam has caused it to be become a replacement for genuine and democratic political legitimacy, which has created a legacy of manipulating Islam through Islamic rhetoric and strategic support of opposing parties to achieve political agendas. As a result, the politicising of Islam has destabilized a central government. Even if Islam was successfully implemented into the constitution, Pakistan’s leaders are still faced with the central question of which Islam should be followed. There are not just conflicts between secularists and Islamists, but conflicts that are sectarian in nature as well. The problem with using Islam as an instrument of unity is that there are various denominations within the civilian population. 98% of the population are Muslim, with Sunni Muslims making up 85% of Pakistani Muslims, whilst the remaining 15% are Shia, and within Sunnism, there are further divisions between Barelvi and Deobandi Muslims. The Islamic diversity within Pakistan has proved problematic for its leaders to unite such a diverse Islamic population. Sectarian conflicts in Pakistan have often been in relation to conflicting views on where Islam fits into public life. Pakistan’s Islamic identity usually leans towards Sunnism as the majority sect, however this has resulted in sporadic outbreaks of violence since 1947 to present day Pakistan. In 1988, Sunni militants massacred and raped Shia civilians after being instructed by the Pakistani military to control a Shia uprising in Gilgit. If the sectarian conflicts are being sponsored by the military, it is impossible for Islam to unite an entire civilian population whose majority and minority sects are being encouraged to carry out acts of violence against each other.

Even within the majority sect, violence between Barelvi and Deobandi movements have been particularly intense. Radical Deobandi groups such as the SSP have carried out suicide attacks and general destruction of the Barelvi holy sites, such as the Sufi shrine ‘Data Darbar’ in Lahore. Clearly, Islam cannot be a unifying factor due to the sectarian conflicts between majority and minorities, and this is perpetuated by the states lack of clarity as to which sect of Islam should be officially followed if Pakistan is to be an Islamic State.

The militarisation of Islam and patronisation of jihadist groups has worsened sectarian divisions, thus proving Islam has not unified Pakistan. In the Zia era (1977-88), covert jihad forces were patronised by the state and used to achieve strategic goals in the Afghan conflict and Kashmir dispute. Zia coordinated the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, advocating and arming Islamic extremists in proxy wars. When the mujahideen did not establish a united government in Afghanistan, they turned their attention to a new movement supported by Pakistan that saw the teaching of an extremist form of Islam in Deobandi madrassas. For instance, Taliban militants have also been trained and taught a violent form of jihad in JUI sponsored madrassas which has been used in conflicts such as in Jammu and Kashmir. As a result, many local militant groups that had been patronised by the state forged connections with global jihadist networks such as Al-Qaeda, who have supported violence against non-Sunni Muslims in Pakistan. For instance, in 1988 Shia Muslims in Gilgit started an uprising against the Zia regime. In response, the Pakistani military inducted Osama Bin Laden and his group of Sunni tribal militias that had been conducting jihad in the North West Frontier Province, to supress the uprising. This resulted in the rape and massacre of Shia civilians in Gilgit.

The problem with facilitating militant Sunni organisations in Kashmir is that the Pakistani government has promoted sectarianism, as most of these jihadist organisations are closely linked to sectarian groups such as the SSP. When these militant groups are not conducting jihad in conflicts such as in Kashmir, they are responsible for organising attacks on Shia Muslims within Pakistan. Sectarian divisions have also been exacerbated through anti-Shia propaganda which is circulated through the thousands of state sponsored Sunni madrassas that preach sectarian hatred against Shia’s and other non-Muslims. Clearly, the active encouragement of extreme Islamist groups has deepened sectarianism in Pakistan showing Islam as a force of division, and not of unity.

To conclude, it was Jinnah’s unclear vision for how Islam was supposed to be implemented into the constitution that paved the way for Islam to be a force of division rather than unity in Pakistan, and sectarian divisions often resulting in sporadic outbreaks of violence have been exacerbated by the states politicising and manipulation of Islam, as well as the militaries patronisation of jihadist groups that have exacerbated sectarian violence.

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