Three reasons community-based targeting is a threat to social stability

The number of conflict-affected countries has more than doubled in the last the last decade.[1] Many low- and middle- income countries are unable to respond to the multitude of challenges they face, such as rising inflation, rising food insecurity and rising inequality. These global pressures often exacerbate fragility and conflict, especially in contexts where poverty and vulnerability are high and social cohesion is already very weak.

Addressing these issues is crucial, as the global community recognizes the need to tackle inequalities that put specific groups, such as marginalised communities, women, and youth, at long-term risk.[2] The concept of a ‘humanitarian-development-peace nexus’ has emerged in response, aiming to address the root causes of conflict and vulnerability—like injustice, inequality, and poverty—thereby reducing the need for humanitarian assistance.[3] A key aspect of this approach is the push toward localisation, which advocates for shifting power and decision-making to local actors and communities, enabling them to lead crisis responses.

Community-based targeting is often promoted as a key tool in advancing the localisation agenda, as it relies on local networks to identify recipients of aid, theoretically fostering social cohesion[5] and empowering communities to take control of their own recovery. The approach builds on existing social structures, using these networks to distribute in-kind or, more recently, cash transfers. Given this reliance on local knowledge, it is no surprise, then, that it has been heralded as the panacea to identifying the most vulnerable in humanitarian and emergency contexts. The underlying premise is that communities, with a deeper understanding of their own needs, are better equipped than external actors to determine who should receive support.[6]

This participatory method is intended not only to empower communities but also to expedite the collection of household data in situations where traditional data sources are unreliable, limited, or conflicting. While this approach aligns with the principles of localisation in theory, in practice, it can create unintended consequences. Although community-based targeting aims to promote local ownership, it often places an unfair burden on communities to decide who should or should not receive support—especially in contexts where resources are scarce. This responsibility can create social tensions and divisions, as communities are forced to make difficult decisions about allocating limited resources. Furthermore, community-based targeting is often built on the assumption that communities are homogenous and harmonious, which is not always the case.[7]  In reality, social tensions exist, particularly in conflict-affected regions, and involving communities in the selection process can have unintended social costs that harm cohesion. Three major risks are highlighted below.

Cost one: Elite capture and nepotism

Community-based targeting can be vulnerable to elite capture[8] and nepotism[9] due to a lack of public accountability and formal grievance processes. Without transparency, beneficiaries may be selected based on favoritism, which can lead to feelings of unfairness, resentment and, in some cases, violence. For instance, in Indonesia, the Bantuan Langsung Tunai programme saw violent backlash against community leaders accused of favouritism in distributing cash benefits.[10]

Cost two: Social exclusion

Marginalised groups, such as ethnic or religious minorities, persons with disabilities and internally displaced persons, are often excluded in community-based targeting because they are perceived as not belonging to the core community. These existing inequalities and tensions can impact the distribution and redistribution of entitlements within community-based targeting programmes. For example, in Somalia, many marginalised groups, such as displaced Bantu groups and Somalis of the “wrong” clan affiliation were excluded from in-kind transfers, most notably by gatekeepers and clan elders.[11]

Cost three: Erosion of social capital

Community-based targeting makes a clear and public division between recipients and non-recipients in a way that risks being perceived as subjective.  Creating ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in this way risks eroding social capital - the relations of trust and reciprocity that bind individuals in a society together.[12]

 When community members do not understand why they were left out, conflicts can arise, especially when basic needs are unmet. A 2007 evaluation of food aid distribution in Somalia found that community-based targeting led to instability, with several violent incidents and food aid being looted. In fact, there were 15 major security incidents in which militia and civilians were killed, and food packages were pillaged.[13] 

There are few publicly available evaluation reports of community-based targeting in recent years. Nevertheless, efforts have been made to improve the system, such as requiring community endorsement of beneficiary lists to reduce corruption. While this step may be an improvement, this can still fuel divisions, as communities gather to decide who is 'deserving' of support, sometimes with deadly consequences. Indeed, a source recently working on implementing a CBT programme in a conflict-related humanitarian emergency reported that the public disclosure and verification of beneficiaries for a cash benefit resulted in one community member being killed by another.[14]

The social costs of community-based targeting are significant and can undermine long-term development goals. Exclusion, social capital erosion, and perceptions of corruption can worsen socio-economic inequalities and contribute to broader challenges, such as youth radicalisation. In Somalia, for instance, youth disenfranchised by exclusion from services and aid are more susceptible to recruitment by armed groups, as seen in the rise of Al Shabaab's youth wing.[15] [16] 

 The way forward

The social costs of community-based targeting are simply too dangerous to ignore. We, the humanitarian and development communities, have a responsibility to design and implement selection criteria that actively prevents social exclusion, elite capture, and the erosion of social capital.

At its core, community-based targeting is a well-intentioned methodology for identifying vulnerability. However, it is time to shift from identifying who is most vulnerable, which is often subjective, to determining when community members are most vulnerable, which can be done using more objective criteria. For instance, the first 1,000 days of life are known to be a critical period of vulnerability. Replacing community-based targeting with clear, verifiable indicators like age, disability, or pregnancy will remove unnecessary confusion around benefits, and advance social cohesion rather than fragment it.

Rethinking vulnerability in this way encourages a more inclusive and objective approach to the distribution of aid. Indeed, utilising more inclusive, objective and transparent targeting mechanisms promotes social cohesion because everyone in the community can win, and if they don’t, they understand why.

References

[1] The World Bank (7 March, 2022). Remarks by World Bank Group President David Malpass at Fragility Forum 2022: Development and Peace in Uncertain Times. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2022/03/07/remarks-by-world-bank-group-president-david-malpass-at-fragility-forum-2022-development-and-peace-in-uncertain-times - :~:text=The number of “conflict countries,efforts to end extreme poverty.

[2] Fanning, E., & Fullwood-Thomas, J. (2019). The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus: What does it mean for multi-mandated organizations?. Oxfam. Available at: https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620820/dp-humanitarian-development-peace-nexus-260619-en.pdf.

[3] Fanning, E., & Fullwood-Thomas, J. (2019). The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus: What does it mean for multi-mandated organizations?. Oxfam. Available at: https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620820/dp-humanitarian-development-peace-nexus-260619-en.pdf; Inter-Agency Standing Committee and UN Working Group on Transitions Workshop, 20-21 October 2016, Background paper on Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/peace-hum-dev_nexus_150927_ver2.docx 

[4] UNESCAP (2015). Time for Equality: the role of social protection in reducing inequalities in Asia and the Pacific. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific; Schjod RJ. Impacts of Social Protection on Social Cohesion and Reconciliation. London: HelpAge International. 2021. 

[5] Leininger, J., Burchi, F., Fiedler, C., Mross, K., Nowack, D., von Schiller, A., Sommer, C., Strupat, C. & Ziaja, S. 2021a. Social cohesion: A new definition and a proposal for its measurement in Africa (Discussion Paper). Bonn: German Development Institute.

[6] WFP, ‘Community-Based Targeting Guide’, February 2015, https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000110378/download/. 

[7] Kidd, S. and Athias, D. (2020). Hit and Miss: An assessment of targeting effectiveness in social protection with additional analysis. London, Development Pathways. Available at: https://www.developmentpathways.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Hit-and-Miss-March13-1.pdf.

[8] Community facilitators using their position to influence the allocation of benefits for personal gain

[9] Community facilitators allocating benefits based on preferential personal relationships

[10] Cameron, Lisa & Shah, Manisha. (2011). Mistargeting of Cash Transfers, Social Capital Destruction and Crime in Indonesia. University of California. Los Angeles. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228959855_Mistargetting_of_Cash_Transfers_Social_Capital_Destruction_and_Crime_in_Indonesia.

[11] Maunder. N., et al. (2018). Somalia: An evaluation of WFP’s Portfolio (2012-2017). Vol 1. WFP Office of Evaluation. Available at: https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000099880/download/ 

[12] Attanasio, Orazio Luca Pellerano and Sandra Polania (2008). Building Trust? Conditional Cash Transfers and Social Capital. IFS Working Papers (EWP08/02), Institute for Fiscal Studies, London

[13] Jaspars and Maxwell, ‘Targeting in Complex Emergencies: Somalia Country Case Study’, Feinstein International Centre, July 2008. Available at: https://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/targeting-in-complex-emergencies-2/.

[14] Interview conducted with humanitarian. Source requested to remain anonymous.  

[15] OECD (2011), Reducing the Involvement of Youth in Armed Violence: Programming Note, Conflict and Fragility, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264107205-en

[16] Botha., A. and Abdile., M. (2014). Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia. Institute for Security Studies. 266. Available at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/184703/Paper266.pdf